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The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climatic
Change, [UNFCCC, 1998], proposes to limit future aggregate anthropogenic carbon
dioxide equivalent greenhouse gas emissions (Article 3.1).   The Kyoto Protocol also
establishes the concept of credits for carbon sinks.  These credits can be used to meet a
country’s emission limitation and reduction commitment.  Currently, carbon sinks are
limited to recent efforts in afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation and do not
include agricultural soils (Article 3.3).  However, Article 3.4 leaves the future inclusion
of agricultural soils a distinct possibility by stating “…Parties to this Protocol
shall…decide upon…guidelines as to how, and which, additional human-induced
activities related to…removals by sinks in agricultural soils and land use change…shall
be added to or subtracted from the assigned amounts…”
Tillage practices are important human-induced activities that deal with carbon
sequestration and greenhouse gas emissions from agricultural soils [Lal et al, 1998].
Conservation tillage reduces soil and water erosion when compared to conventional
plow-based tillage systems.  Conventional tillage systems churn up the soil and leave it
unprotected, so that soil organic carbon levels decrease from wind and water erosion.
Increasing the adoption of conservation tillage practices will increase carbon
sequestration rates in agricultural soils and decrease greenhouse gas emissions.
The purpose of this research is to discuss the relative efficiency of various
government-based and market-based instruments available to policymakers that reduce
the amount of carbon emissions from agricultural soils through the increased adoption of
conservation tillage.  First, various government-based subsidy schemes that encourage2
the adoption of conservation tillage are examined.  Next, various market-based policy
instruments of granting producers a carbon credit [Sandor and Skees, 1999] are
examined.  The total expected cost of reducing agricultural carbon emissions is estimated
for both the government and market-based programs.  The relative efficiency of these
different programs are then determined.
2.  Theoretical Model
Producers will adopt either a conventional or conservation tillage system when
growing their crops.  Let E
cv p and  E
cs p denote the expected returns from conventional
and conservation tillage practices.  Producers are assumed to be risk neutral and adopt the
tillage system that maximizes expected returns.  The expected returns from conventional
and conservation tillage, however, are not observable.  The choice between conventional
and conservation tillage is observable as well as production and geographical
characteristics such as soil, weather, land, and cropping patterns.
The expected returns from each tillage system is assumed to be linearly related to
the vector of observable production and geographical characteristics (x),
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Let Y =1 denote the adoption of conservation tillage and Y = 0 denote the use of
conventional tillage.  The probability of a producer adopting conservation tillage is,
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The error term e  is assumed to be logistically distributed.  So then,
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Suppose a green payment, k, is offered to further entice the adoption of
conservation tillage practices.  The adoption of conservation tillage will occur if the
expected returns from conservation tillage plus the green payment exceed the expected
returns from conventional tillage, i.e., Ek E
cs cv pp +> .   With green payments, the
probability of a producer adopting conservation tillage practices becomes,
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The choice of a tillage system affects the environment in many different ways, but
only carbon supply curves will be derived in this section.  Suppose, there are M  states,
each state has rm production regions, and each region growsN  crops.  Let ximn denote
the production and geographical characteristics at the i
th production site in the m
th state
growing the n
th crop.  The carbon emissions from conventional and conservation tillage
are denoted as Yx Yx imn imn 01 16 16  and  .  The expected amount of carbon emitted into the
atmosphere is equal to the amount of carbon released when using conservation tillage
multiplied by the probability of using conservation tillage plus the amount of carbon
released when using conventional tillage multiplied by the probability of using
conventional tillage.  With green payments, the expected amount of carbon emitted into
the atmosphere on a per acre basis is, LOSS k x imn imn ( | ), and equal to,
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The total expected amount of carbon sequestered, Qkx imn imn imn ( | ), is defined as the
difference between the amount of carbon released if conventional tillage is used with
certainty minus the expected amount of carbon emitted under the green payment,
Q k x Y xL O S S x N AL O S S xL O S S k x N A imn imn imn imn imn imn imn imn imn imn ( | ) ( )( | ) ( | )( | ) . =- + - 00 04
Various government-based subsidy programs that encourage the adoption of
conservation tillage could be under the auspices of the Environmental Quality Incentives
Program (EQIP).  EQIP offers assistance where significant natural resource problems,
such as soil erosion, exist.  A by-product of reducing soil erosion is increased carbon
sequestration in agricultural soils.  Under an EQIP subsidy program, a green payment in
the form of a per acre subsidy is offered to producers in order to encourage the adoption
of conservation tillage.  Once a green payment is presented, producers can either accept
or refuse the offer.  Producers adopting conservation tillage practices receive their
subsidy and producers using conventional tillage practices receive nothing.
An EQIP subsidy scheme could take many different forms.  A single EQIP
subsidy program is defined as when all producers are offered the same subsidy.  A
minimum cost EQIP subsidy program is defined as the subsidy scheme that minimizes
the expected cost of sequestering an expected level of carbon.  This paper examines the
relative efficiency of a single subsidy EQIP program by comparing it the minimum
expected cost EQIP subsidy program.
Market-based solutions are also investigated in the form of a carbon credit
program.  In a carbon credit program, producers receive a carbon credit from the
government that is redeemable in an organized carbon market outside of the agricultural
sector.  Given the market price of carbon, producers can either sell their carbon credit and
use conservation tillage practices or keep their carbon credit and use conventional tillage
practices.  Carbon credit programs are differentiated by the amount of carbon credit given
to each producer.  It will be shown that by varying the distribution of carbon credits, a5
market-based carbon credit program can become equivalent to any type of government-
based EQIP subsidy program.
An EQIP subsidy program is a collection of subsidies, denoted by kk imn = () ,
where kimn is the per acre subsidy offered to the producer in the i
th region of the m
th state
growing the n
th crop. The expected number of acres using conservation tillage practices
under an EQIP subsidy program is denoted as NA k ( ) and equal to,
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The total expected level of carbon sequestration, Qk 16 , is equal to,
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The total expected cost of an EQIP subsidy program,TC Q k 16 27 , is equal to,
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Many EQIP subsidy schemes will produce the same expected overall level of
carbon sequestration but at different expected costs. The subsidy scheme that minimizes
the total expected cost of acquiring a given level of expected carbon, Q , is found by,
Min k G x k NA Q Q x k
kimn
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The first order condition states that at the minimum, the expected marginal cost of
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The Lagrange multiplier, l
*, represents the optimal expected marginal cost of
acquiring carbon, TCimn is the total expected cost of acquiring carbon from the i
th
producer in the m
th state growing the n
th crop, and kimn
*  represents its optimal subsidy.  If
the expected marginal costs of acquiring carbon from a source exceeds the expected
marginal costs from another source, then total expected costs of carbon sequestration can
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where;
     elasticity  of  adoption.
The elasticity of adoption  wimn 16  represents a producer’s willingness to adopt
conservation practices.  The greater the elasticity of adoption, the greater the response in
the conservation tillage adoption rate given a marginal increase in the subsidy.  The acre
difference in the amount of carbon emissions between conventional and conservation
tillage  Yx Yx imn imn 01 () () - 16  represents the producer’s ability to sequester carbon.  Under
the cost minimizing EQIP subsidy program, producers with a greater willingness to adopt
conservation tillage and ability to sequester carbon will receive the greater subsidies.
The second order condition for a minimum is not met, since the adoption function
may be either concave or convex.  A grid search was conducted to find the l
* that
minimized the total expected costs of sequestering an expected level of carbon.
Offering a different subsidy to each producer, will create very high administrative
costs and may also be politically infeasible.  To reduce these barriers, a single subsidy7
EQIP program is examined, so that kk imn =  for all ( , , ) imn.  A single subsidy EQIP
program, however, will have higher carbon acqusition costs.
Figure 1 presents for the two-producer case the relative inefficiency of the single
EQIP subsidy program.  The iso-carbon curves, Q, represent the combination of subsidies
kk 12 , 16  that leave the overall expected level of carbon sequestration unchanged.  The iso-
cost curves, TC, represent the combination of subsidies that leave the overall expected
cost of carbon sequestration unchanged.  The slopes of the iso-carbon and iso-cost curves
are shown to be convex and concave, but this may not necessarily be the case.  As stated




S  represents the solution set for the single EQIP subsidy program.
At point B, the single EQIP subsidy program is expected to sequester Q0 amount of
carbon at an expected cost of TC1.  Points A and C represent the minimum cost EQIP
subsidy schemes that are expected to sequester Q0 and Q1 amounts of carbon,
respectively.  The relative inefficiency of the single EQIP subsidy scheme can be
expressed as the increase in total expected costs, TC1-TC0, for the given level of carbon
sequestration Q0 as well as in terms of the decreased level of carbon sequestration Q1 - Q0
for a given level of expected cost TC1.
A carbon credit program is denoted by the distribution of carbon credits to
producers, zz imn =16 , where zimn is the per acre carbon credit given to the producer in the
ith region of the mth state growing the nth crop.  The agricultural sector is assumed to be
a price-taker in an external carbon market and producers are able to sell their carbon
credit at an exogenous carbon price  p.  Hence, the per acre incentive to adopt
conservation tillage under the carbon credit program is equal to  pzimn .8
Therefore, every possible EQIP government subsidy program has an equivalent
market-based solution.  For example, the carbon credit program that mimics the
minimum cost EQIP subsidy program is denoted as zz
imn
** =38  where zk p
imn imn
** =   and
kimn
*  is the minimum cost EQIP subsidy offered to the producer in the ith region of the
mth state growing the nth crop.  Similarly, the carbon credit program that mimics the
single EQIP subsidy program, kk i m n imn =  for all  , , 16 , is denoted as zz imn =  for all
  imn ,, 16 , where zk p =  is the carbon credit given to all producers.
3. Empirical Analysis
The study region consists of a twelve state area in the Midwest.  There are five
crops and fourteen rotations in the analysis [Babcock et al, 1997].  The primary data
source is the USDA National Resource Conservation Service’s National Resource
Inventory (NRI) conducted at 160,000 points in the study area.  For each NRI point,
information is collected on the natural resource characteristics of the land, the farming
practices used by the producer, and weather characteristics.
The empirical analysis relies heavily on two models previously developed and
used in the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development’s (CARD) publication
Resource and Agricultural Policy System’s (RAPS) 1997 Agricultural and Environmental
Outlook [Babcock et al, 1997].  First, the Site-Specific Pollution Production modeling
system which estimates the difference in carbons emissions from conventional and
conservation tillage [Mitchell et al. (1997)].  Second, is the Acreage Response Modeling
System (ARMS) which projects crop choices and crop rotation given the climatic
conditions and market conditions.  Given the predictions of crop choices and crop9
rotations, we then use variables such as land, soil, and weather charateristics as well as
cropping history to estimate the probability of adopting conservation tillage practices.
The percentage of acreage adopting conservation tillage practices has changed
significantly from 1992 to 1997.  The conservation tillage adoption model is estimated
using 1992 data, so a calibrating factor, a , is introduced to accurately reflect the current
tillage environment from the 1992 base year.  The model estimates are adjusted by
selecting an a  such that the proportion of land using conservation tillage practices in the
current year equals the expected proportion of land predicted by the adoption model.
Furthermore, the error term is assumed to be logistically distributed with a fixed
variance of p
2 3 when estimating the conservation tillage adoption model.  This variance
determines the size of payment needed to increase the probability of adoption to a certain
level.  In 1997, 39.8% of the total study area acreage was in conservation tillage.  This
implies an “overall study area average” bx value of -04138 . .  The payment, k, needed to
ensure a 95% percent adoption rate is then $3.36 per acre.  This payment is the same
whether the choice is between tillage systems, investment choices, or business decisions.
For the logit model to be meaningful in each separate application, an additional
“identifying” restriction is needed to reflect the resistance of adopting conservation
tillage.  The payments necessary to entice 95% of current non-adopters of other
environmentally beneficial management practices have been estimated in the range of
$65 to $75 per acre [Cooper and Keim, 1996].  The current adoption rates for these
practices are, however, much lower than for conservation tillage.  Hence it is assumed
that a 95% adoption rate occurs with a $20 per acre subsidy.  As a result, the subsidies are10
multiplied by the factor 5.96, which is found by dividing the assumed $20 payment by
the payment found with the unidentified logit model ($3.36).
4. Results
The study area sequestered approximately 11.45 million metric tons (mmt) of
carbon from the current use of conservation tillage.  The overall rate of conservation
tillage adoption is currently 39.8%.  If all producers adopted conservation tillage, an
additional 14 million metric tons of carbon would be sequestered or 25.87 mmt of carbon.
Figure 2 compares the total expected costs of acquiring carbon from the single
subsidy and minimum cost EQIP programs.  The expected total cost curves are convex
and become vertical near the capacity of 25.87 mmt of carbon.  The expected cost under
the single subsidy EQIP program is $172 million and $3.4 billion when sequestering
13.18 mmt and 23.90 mmt of expected carbon respectively.  However, the expected cost
under the minimum cost EQIP subsidy program is $53 million and $2.6 billion.  Hence,
the inefficiency of the single subsidy EQIP program relative to the minimum cost EQIP
subsidy program is $119 million when sequestering 13.18 mmt of expected carbon and
$800 million when sequestering 23.90 mmt of expected carbon.
5. Conclusions
The purpose of this research was to examine various policy instruments that
promote carbon sequestration in agricultural soils and mitigate greenhouse gas emissions
through increased adoption of conservation tillage.  It was shown that that by varying the
distribution of carbon credits given to producers, a market-based carbon credit program
can become equivalent to any type of government-based EQIP subsidy program.  Hence,11
the payments needed to increase the agricultural sector’s adoption of conservation tillage
can be switched from the public sector to the private sector.
The expected cost of carbon sequestration was estimated for the single subsidy
and minimum cost EQIP programs.  Identical expected costs of carbon sequestration
would occur under a carbon credit program as under the EQIP subsidy program given the
appropriate distribution of carbon credits.  A different subsidy or size of carbon credit,
however, may be prohibitively costly due to high administrative and political costs.  A
single subsidy or size of carbon credit program will lower these costs, but will lead to
higher acquisition costs.  The relative inefficiency of the single subsidy or carbon credit
program was measured in terms of the increase in expected costs when sequestering an
expected level of carbon.  The inefficiency was estimated to be $119 million when
sequestering 13.18 mmt of expected carbon and $800 million when sequestering 23.90
mmt of expected carbon.  If the political and administrative costs are higher than these
levels, then a single subsidy or carbon credit is more economically feasible.
Other intermediate program should also be investigated such as different subsidies
or carbon credits based upon the producer’s location and/or crop grown.  These
intermediate programs will have lower expected operational costs than the single subsidy
or carbon credit programs as well as lower administrative and political costs than the
minimum cost programs.  Hence, overall expected costs of carbon sequestration may be









Figure 1.  Relative Inefficiency of the Single
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